Busy most of this month so this blog will be quiet.
Wrote this on google android - HTC Magic so screen keyboard. Neat :-)
Tuesday, 7 July 2009
Wednesday, 24 June 2009
Method versus Metaphysics
We are all born ignorant. We do not like being ignorant and (most of us) seek to alleviate ourselves of ignorance. We also do not like to be mistaken in our knowledge that we gain in alleviating our ignorance.
However there are two ways to alleviate this ignorance. One approach is to assume as many answers as possible about the world and assume the world fits these answers. The other is to assume as little as possible about the world and see what the world says first. The former approach emphasizes metaphysics (or ontology- what there is) over method. The latter approach emphasizes method over metaphysics.
These are two poles in a continuum, of course. It is useful to look at these extremes in emphasis to clearly see the difference between them.
The metaphysics first approach provides answers, the method first approach provides questions. The metaphysics first approach protects answers, the method first approach questions questions. The metaphysics first approach seeks methods to support its answers. The method first approach seeks methods to challenge its answers.The metaphysics first approach rejects methods that deny its answers. The method first approach encourages methods that challenge its methods. The metaphysics first approach assumes certainty in its answers. The method first approach seeks errors in it's answers. The metaphysics first approach discourages questioning its answers. The method first approach encourages questioning its answers.
The distinction becomes more highlighted when looking at methods. The method first approach seeks reliable, repeatable, reviewable, revisable, replaceable, robust, independent methods that converge on the same answer. It rejects methods provide divergent answers. It has found these latter methods not to be reliable, repeatable or robust. When subject to review, revision, replacement or rejection such methods have been rejected with no replacement being required,
Such rejected methods are typically subjective methods - those based on authority, texts, personal revelations, inner experiences. These have been repeatedly shown to to be unreliable, not robust and lead to divergent entailments with no independent means of selecting one entailments over another. These are some of the most popular methods to support extreme metaphysics first approaches. But this indicates there is no way to know if any of those metaphysical approaches are correct. They usually insist they are but are contrary because they make divergent claims of the world and they cannot al be correct and could all be false. There is no way of knowing.
In stating the above I have been employing the method first approach which some might argue is question begging. However since the metaphysics first approaches - such as popular religions and some extreme political ideologies - can offer no independent means to determine which, if any, are correct, then there is nothing else but such a method approach to help distinguish them and, possibly, eliminate them all. So it is no surprise that many of these metaphysics first approaches are opposed to method first approaches and seek to tarnish, devalue or deny the validity of such methods.
Now, sometimes, selectively, when the results of such methods could support the presumed answers of a metaphysics first approach, then such methods are used and encouraged. However this only goes to confirm a the problem with such metaphysics first approaches. If a method is only used when it supports the pre-determined answer and rejected when it does not, then there is no way to know whether the answer is correct. So there is no way to know whether one's ignorance has been alleviated or just deceived. The whole project that metaphysics first approaches were meant to answer - the alleviation of ignorance about the world - collapses. No true knowledge can results unless there are methods that can independently show this.
We are lucky to live in the 21st century where there has been some much progress in the development and refinement of methods based approaches that have not only demonstrated in far greater scope and detail what the world is like far beyond the imaginings of any metaphysics first approach - old and new. And we rely on the results of such knowledge in numerous ways on a moment to moment and day to day basis. There is no longer any excusefor seek a metaphysics first approach given the huge success of the methods first approaches that we cannot stop using and relying upon. We have no excuse, as in the past, not to seek methods that independently converge on similar answers - which are called and usually are objective methods and to reject methods that independently fail to converge and provide divergent and incompatible answers. We have no excuse that is if we wish to free ourselves of ignorance about the world. We know that subjective methods used in support of metaphysics first approaches have repeatedly failed to give us accurate knowledge of the world and can only be used to provide comfort not truth.
The choice is yours, do you prefer comfort over truth or truth over comfort? Do you prefer an illusory certainty or over an actual uncertainty. Can anyone justify sacrificing truth on the altar of comfort if you aspire to knowledge of the world? Not without contradicting themselves they cannot. Is it not sensible to choose method over metaphysics?
However there are two ways to alleviate this ignorance. One approach is to assume as many answers as possible about the world and assume the world fits these answers. The other is to assume as little as possible about the world and see what the world says first. The former approach emphasizes metaphysics (or ontology- what there is) over method. The latter approach emphasizes method over metaphysics.
These are two poles in a continuum, of course. It is useful to look at these extremes in emphasis to clearly see the difference between them.
The metaphysics first approach provides answers, the method first approach provides questions. The metaphysics first approach protects answers, the method first approach questions questions. The metaphysics first approach seeks methods to support its answers. The method first approach seeks methods to challenge its answers.The metaphysics first approach rejects methods that deny its answers. The method first approach encourages methods that challenge its methods. The metaphysics first approach assumes certainty in its answers. The method first approach seeks errors in it's answers. The metaphysics first approach discourages questioning its answers. The method first approach encourages questioning its answers.
The distinction becomes more highlighted when looking at methods. The method first approach seeks reliable, repeatable, reviewable, revisable, replaceable, robust, independent methods that converge on the same answer. It rejects methods provide divergent answers. It has found these latter methods not to be reliable, repeatable or robust. When subject to review, revision, replacement or rejection such methods have been rejected with no replacement being required,
Such rejected methods are typically subjective methods - those based on authority, texts, personal revelations, inner experiences. These have been repeatedly shown to to be unreliable, not robust and lead to divergent entailments with no independent means of selecting one entailments over another. These are some of the most popular methods to support extreme metaphysics first approaches. But this indicates there is no way to know if any of those metaphysical approaches are correct. They usually insist they are but are contrary because they make divergent claims of the world and they cannot al be correct and could all be false. There is no way of knowing.
In stating the above I have been employing the method first approach which some might argue is question begging. However since the metaphysics first approaches - such as popular religions and some extreme political ideologies - can offer no independent means to determine which, if any, are correct, then there is nothing else but such a method approach to help distinguish them and, possibly, eliminate them all. So it is no surprise that many of these metaphysics first approaches are opposed to method first approaches and seek to tarnish, devalue or deny the validity of such methods.
Now, sometimes, selectively, when the results of such methods could support the presumed answers of a metaphysics first approach, then such methods are used and encouraged. However this only goes to confirm a the problem with such metaphysics first approaches. If a method is only used when it supports the pre-determined answer and rejected when it does not, then there is no way to know whether the answer is correct. So there is no way to know whether one's ignorance has been alleviated or just deceived. The whole project that metaphysics first approaches were meant to answer - the alleviation of ignorance about the world - collapses. No true knowledge can results unless there are methods that can independently show this.
We are lucky to live in the 21st century where there has been some much progress in the development and refinement of methods based approaches that have not only demonstrated in far greater scope and detail what the world is like far beyond the imaginings of any metaphysics first approach - old and new. And we rely on the results of such knowledge in numerous ways on a moment to moment and day to day basis. There is no longer any excusefor seek a metaphysics first approach given the huge success of the methods first approaches that we cannot stop using and relying upon. We have no excuse, as in the past, not to seek methods that independently converge on similar answers - which are called and usually are objective methods and to reject methods that independently fail to converge and provide divergent and incompatible answers. We have no excuse that is if we wish to free ourselves of ignorance about the world. We know that subjective methods used in support of metaphysics first approaches have repeatedly failed to give us accurate knowledge of the world and can only be used to provide comfort not truth.
The choice is yours, do you prefer comfort over truth or truth over comfort? Do you prefer an illusory certainty or over an actual uncertainty. Can anyone justify sacrificing truth on the altar of comfort if you aspire to knowledge of the world? Not without contradicting themselves they cannot. Is it not sensible to choose method over metaphysics?
Tuesday, 23 June 2009
Six new disproofs of God?
Filed under
religion
Unlike Luke of Commonsense Atheism, I find philosophy of religion woefully uninteresting*. Indeed studying philosophy the scholastics was easily the most boring period of philosophy ever. Nonetheless I have come across a new book by a member of the NSS, Geoffrey Berg, called "The Six Ways of Atheism" containing six new logical disproofs of God. These disproofs are listed in his above linked site. The book develops the arguments in detail, I presume (I have not read it...yet).
I am not sure all six arguments are that original, argument #2 - comprehending god ; argument #3 - god has no explanatory value; and argument #4 - not the best of all possible worlds - have certainly been said in many ways before, whether developed as a pure logical argument, I don't know, but then,as I said, I am no longer interested in philosophy of religion. Then again one does not need to be familiar with this to know the problems with god, any schoolboy can come up with the main arguments against god, being entirely unfamiliar with the academic or theological literature. I am not the first and certainly not the last to have worked this out by around the age of 11 and really out of the huge volumes I have read in the past on this, very little, however well thought and and refined, has really added anything of substance to the arguments that were obvious to me at that age.
Still the other three arguments are relatively new. Argument #1, argument #5, argument #6 are worth some consideration.
I do like this, but I have long used the old Buddhist argument that god is deluded - and how would anyone know otherwise? Add that Hum;es point which is more plausible, a deluded being claiming it was god, or that it was god? Again I have long used criticism's of Laplace's demon to come up with something similar to here. However the conciseness of it is impressive, especially when stated as a logical paradox "God cannot exist because God cannot know for sure that it is God". This is stronger than the Buddhist argument as it better indicates the self-delusion of such a being and goes further in implying that it is not logically possibly for such a being not to be deluded!
This is a point I made recently in my discussion on Euthyphro and, I am sure, was not the first, even Socrates implied this although did not develop it fully. An inherent property such as "goodness" is not the type of thing that could be in God's (or anyone's) nature. Berg has made this a general point. Interesting.
I will need to get the book to really check out how logically tight his arguments are and maybe they are original in being logical arguments rather than just points we have all used in reasoning against god conceptions. The response of a religious reviewer is amusing:
h/t Barry Duke
* Still I do thoroughly appreciate what Luke is doing on his blog and read his posts as a summary of the issues. Highly recommend.
I am not sure all six arguments are that original, argument #2 - comprehending god ; argument #3 - god has no explanatory value; and argument #4 - not the best of all possible worlds - have certainly been said in many ways before, whether developed as a pure logical argument, I don't know, but then,as I said, I am no longer interested in philosophy of religion. Then again one does not need to be familiar with this to know the problems with god, any schoolboy can come up with the main arguments against god, being entirely unfamiliar with the academic or theological literature. I am not the first and certainly not the last to have worked this out by around the age of 11 and really out of the huge volumes I have read in the past on this, very little, however well thought and and refined, has really added anything of substance to the arguments that were obvious to me at that age.
Still the other three arguments are relatively new. Argument #1, argument #5, argument #6 are worth some consideration.
Argument #1: The Aggregate of Qualities Argument
1. If God exists, God must necessarily possess all of several remarkable qualities (including supreme goodness, omnipotence, immortality, omniscience, ultimate creator, purpose giver).This is an implausibility argument, still if god created the universe, I am not sure how this is really meant to apply since it assumes that god is an entity within the universe so how can it have the quality of "ultimate creator"?
2. Every one of these qualities may not exist in any one entity and if any such quality does exist it exists in few entities or in some cases (e.g. omnipotence, ultimate creator) in at most one entity.
3. Therefore it is highly unlikely any entity would possess even one of these qualities.
4. There is an infinitesimal chance that any one entity (given the almost infinite number of entities in the Universe) might possess the combination of even some two of these qualities, let alone all of them.
5. In statistical analysis a merely hypothetical infinitesimal chance can in effect be treated as the no chance to which it approximates so very closely.
6. Therefore as there is statistically such an infinitesimal chance of any entity possessing, as God would have to do, all God’s essential qualities in combination it can be said for all practical and statistical purposes that God just does not exist.
Argument #5: The Universal Uncertainty Argument
1. An uncertain God is a contradiction in terms.
2. Everything in the Universe must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to the Universe as a whole because there is no way of attaining such certainty.
3. Therefore even an entity with all God’s other qualities cannot have the final quality of certain knowledge concerning its own relationship to the Universe as a whole.
4. Therefore God cannot exist because even any potential God cannot know for sure that it is God.
I do like this, but I have long used the old Buddhist argument that god is deluded - and how would anyone know otherwise? Add that Hum;es point which is more plausible, a deluded being claiming it was god, or that it was god? Again I have long used criticism's of Laplace's demon to come up with something similar to here. However the conciseness of it is impressive, especially when stated as a logical paradox "God cannot exist because God cannot know for sure that it is God". This is stronger than the Buddhist argument as it better indicates the self-delusion of such a being and goes further in implying that it is not logically possibly for such a being not to be deluded!
Argument 6: The ‘Some Of God’s Defining Qualities Cannot Exist’ Argument
1. God must have certain characteristic qualities (such as providing purpose to life), otherwise he would not be God.
2. But it is impossible for any entity to possess some of these qualities (such as providing purpose to life since we can find no real purpose and therefore we in practice have no ultimate purpose to our lives) that are essential to God.
3. Therefore since some of God’s essential qualities (such as being the purpose provider to life) cannot possibly exist in any entity, God cannot exist.
I will need to get the book to really check out how logically tight his arguments are and maybe they are original in being logical arguments rather than just points we have all used in reasoning against god conceptions. The response of a religious reviewer is amusing:
"the question remains: does the cumulative force of Berg’s arguments genuinely represent the decisive proof against God’s existence that he claims?He agrees that the six arguments are logically watertight but then says this do not apply to god. However any generalised ground of being type of god is far closer to "eastern" religious (often specifically non-theistic) conceptions and creates a huge gap between such a conception and the Christian God, with all that immaculate conception, son of himself, killed and resurrected fairy tales. I think it is is illegitimate for a Christian to switch from the personal, embodied, miraculous and resurrected God bullshit and the vague ground of being notions. It really is ridiculous and absurd to believe in them both together. I don't know how any Christian honestly does it, but then I never was one so who am I to say.
The answer is, in my view at least, yes; and I also think it matters not one whit. Quite simply because Berg, like Dawkins before him and in common with so many aggressive atheists, has fallen into the trap of regarding God as an entity within the universe. As he rightly insists, such an entity cannot and does not exist, has never existed beyond the human imagination.”
h/t Barry Duke
* Still I do thoroughly appreciate what Luke is doing on his blog and read his posts as a summary of the issues. Highly recommend.
Monday, 22 June 2009
Can one be good with God?
Can one be good with god?
First my use here of this question is not to encourage or presume prejudice and bigotry against certain theists. Still it is a legitimate question to ask.
One answer is trivially yes but only in spite of god not because of god. That is people read in what they want and so they could read in a decent set of moral values or anything else and claim it came from god. One issue is that this could be "anything else". They could just as easily get a supposed independent confirmation of their prejudices.
The real issue is what is the answer if people try to do it because of god. This is not over whether a god exists nor whether they have the right conception of such a god but rather that it appears to directly conflict with the evidence-based empirical based approach any other remotely plausible moral theory. Has anyone ever been moral because of god?
There are quite a few Christians I have come across, more online than face to face, who argue that is their Christian beliefs that have saved them. Prior to getting this religion they were "sinners" - usually addicts or prostitutes and criminals or some equivalent combination. I certainly would not want to disavow them of their beliefs, if this led them to return to their old ways, which would not help them nor anyone else. Still what Christianity serves here is a useful fiction that enables some to be better people than would have been otherwise. However there are many belief systems that could do this and not all require a god belief. It could just as easily happen with other non-theistic religions such as Advaita, Zen, Taoism or Buddhism. It does not have to be a religion it could be Humanism for example.
Such useful fictions work based on their prior life experiences including propaganda and indoctrination - whether it succeeded in the past or failed. Consequently different people will respond to different useful fictions. So it is not surprising that many have found solace in Christianity since it has such a dominant effect on the upbringing of many children - even if it fails to take hold when they were younger.
The real issue here is to what extent they were mis-educated morally when they were younger as a result of thinking that religion and morality are necessarily related - a fiction and fallacy promoted by many religions. Surely to the degree that this is pervasive in one's upbringing, this contributes to a misunderstanding of what it is to be moral, it supports a lack of moral education, - quite the opposite of many Christina claim's to provide a moral education. It is a deceit, making people think they cannot be moral without the crutch of the church. This serves to produces moral cripples. How many of those who fell on hard times and were "saved" were the product of such miseducation in the first place?
I can only only speculate on such relations but this is certainly supported by the numerous correlation studies that objectively show the degree of religiosity is correlated with social ills. Could it be that a causative factor in this relation is due to the moral miseducation and the attempt by popular strands of Christianity to produce moral cripples, who when not reliant on the crutch of the church, mistakenly think anything goes and eventually suffer the consequences?
So, yes, some people have become moral - better members of a civilised and shared society because of their god beliefs but not because of god per se. However would society not be better off if people had better moral beliefs to start with, then they would have needed to resort to mistaken god beliefs to sort themselves out nor indeed find out that it was partly those mistaken god beleifs that helped them get into trouble in the first place?
Once one explores the question of "can one be good with God" without prejudgement, one realises the problem in asking "can one be good without God". Both are misleading questions. The one I asked here going to negate the effect of asking the more popular variant. The proper question is more simply "can one be good?" - what is required in general. History and philosophy has more than amply demonstrated that belief in a god, or not, is not required. As long as enough people think that asking "can one be good without god" is a legitimate question (ignoring the prejudice often behind such a question), surely one has to ask is "that religion the disease it is trying to cure"?
First my use here of this question is not to encourage or presume prejudice and bigotry against certain theists. Still it is a legitimate question to ask.
One answer is trivially yes but only in spite of god not because of god. That is people read in what they want and so they could read in a decent set of moral values or anything else and claim it came from god. One issue is that this could be "anything else". They could just as easily get a supposed independent confirmation of their prejudices.
The real issue is what is the answer if people try to do it because of god. This is not over whether a god exists nor whether they have the right conception of such a god but rather that it appears to directly conflict with the evidence-based empirical based approach any other remotely plausible moral theory. Has anyone ever been moral because of god?
There are quite a few Christians I have come across, more online than face to face, who argue that is their Christian beliefs that have saved them. Prior to getting this religion they were "sinners" - usually addicts or prostitutes and criminals or some equivalent combination. I certainly would not want to disavow them of their beliefs, if this led them to return to their old ways, which would not help them nor anyone else. Still what Christianity serves here is a useful fiction that enables some to be better people than would have been otherwise. However there are many belief systems that could do this and not all require a god belief. It could just as easily happen with other non-theistic religions such as Advaita, Zen, Taoism or Buddhism. It does not have to be a religion it could be Humanism for example.
Such useful fictions work based on their prior life experiences including propaganda and indoctrination - whether it succeeded in the past or failed. Consequently different people will respond to different useful fictions. So it is not surprising that many have found solace in Christianity since it has such a dominant effect on the upbringing of many children - even if it fails to take hold when they were younger.
The real issue here is to what extent they were mis-educated morally when they were younger as a result of thinking that religion and morality are necessarily related - a fiction and fallacy promoted by many religions. Surely to the degree that this is pervasive in one's upbringing, this contributes to a misunderstanding of what it is to be moral, it supports a lack of moral education, - quite the opposite of many Christina claim's to provide a moral education. It is a deceit, making people think they cannot be moral without the crutch of the church. This serves to produces moral cripples. How many of those who fell on hard times and were "saved" were the product of such miseducation in the first place?
I can only only speculate on such relations but this is certainly supported by the numerous correlation studies that objectively show the degree of religiosity is correlated with social ills. Could it be that a causative factor in this relation is due to the moral miseducation and the attempt by popular strands of Christianity to produce moral cripples, who when not reliant on the crutch of the church, mistakenly think anything goes and eventually suffer the consequences?
So, yes, some people have become moral - better members of a civilised and shared society because of their god beliefs but not because of god per se. However would society not be better off if people had better moral beliefs to start with, then they would have needed to resort to mistaken god beliefs to sort themselves out nor indeed find out that it was partly those mistaken god beleifs that helped them get into trouble in the first place?
Once one explores the question of "can one be good with God" without prejudgement, one realises the problem in asking "can one be good without God". Both are misleading questions. The one I asked here going to negate the effect of asking the more popular variant. The proper question is more simply "can one be good?" - what is required in general. History and philosophy has more than amply demonstrated that belief in a god, or not, is not required. As long as enough people think that asking "can one be good without god" is a legitimate question (ignoring the prejudice often behind such a question), surely one has to ask is "that religion the disease it is trying to cure"?
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