tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-154495438763509967.post7052011517183779832..comments2024-01-28T06:24:50.005+00:00Comments on No Double Standards: Why consider all desires that exist?Martin Freedmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-154495438763509967.post-49206180405491816702010-04-14T10:31:01.581+01:002010-04-14T10:31:01.581+01:00Just in case you have not noticed I have addressed...Just in case you have not noticed I have addressed your questions in the comments here in three new separate posts, two of which have, so far, been publishedMartin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-154495438763509967.post-23039237476294248212010-04-09T01:30:36.910+01:002010-04-09T01:30:36.910+01:00Thanks for the response. Let's take a look ba...Thanks for the response. Let's take a look back at my initial question/objection:<br /><br />Kip> Desirism states: a practical-ought is relative to "the desires in question"; a moral-ought is relative to "all the desires that exist". Why "all the desires that exist", and not just a subset of them?<br /><br />Your answer, in part, states that it <b>is</b> just a subset of the desires that exist to which a moral-ought is relative:<br /><br />faithlessgod> ...out of “all desires that exist” it is only the ones that are affected that are an issue...<br />faithlessgod> In short that is no demand for omniscience and such cognitive limitations are incorporated into any desirist analysis of any situation.<br /><br />So, a "moral-ought" is relative to desires that a) are affected, and b) can be reasonably known given the limits of human faculties.<br /><br />Clearly, then, this is not "all desires that exist". A moral-ought is relative to a subset of all desires that (possibly) exist given your qualifications above. I think this is fine, though. I think the theory still stands. But this "all desires that exist" terminology needs to be clarified to include the qualifications you've pointed out here.<br /><br />Now, let's move on to the other side of my objection:<br /><br />Kip> I think a group of moral agents should (prudential reason for action) only consider the desires that are able to influence their desires (either through moral tools or force). The agents using the social tools should (prudentially) consider any and all desires that need to be harmonized. They should not (prudentially) consider desires that do not need to be harmonized...<br /><br />Apart from your list of reasons why a group might not consider the desires of another group, you just assert:<br /><br />faithlessgod> The many answers bulleted above all fail as rational and empirical justifications for Group A’s practises.<br /><br />Group A may have very many prudential reasons for ignoring the desires of Group B -- or perhaps they just don't have any prudential reasons to consider the desires of Group B. In other words, none of their desires will be fulfilled by considering the desires of Group B. Or, perhaps even, more of their desires will be thwarted by considering the desires of Group B.<br /><br />So, without begging the question, <b>why</b> should Group A consider the desires of Group B, if 1) more of their desires will be fulfilled by not considering them, and 2) Group B has no way of influencing the desires of Group A (though force or social tools).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com